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Abstract
Poole, Bradley R. M.A. The University of Memphis. May/2011. “An Approach
Integrating Deterrence and Rational Choice Theory.” Major Professor: Dr. K.B. Turner
This study used an integrative theoretical approach. Criminological theories
(deterrence and rational choice) were utilized in the theoretical framework for this study.
A massive literature review was included in this study to help connect the theories being
integrated. In the fall of 2010, approximately 505 students from the University of
Memphis were used as the unit of analysis to examine their perceptions about offending,
specifically, illegal parking. The respondents were all given a questionnaire that was
used to measure two essential components of deterrence theory: certainty and severity of
punishment. The questionnaire also asked the respondents about their perceptions of
illegal parking issues on campus. This component assisted the researcher in testing
rational choice theory as students underwent a cost/benefit analysis. Certainty and
severity of punishment both proved to be factors that deterred the students from
offending. However, students’ perceptions about offending were not associated with
students’ actual offending patterns.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There is a movement in contemporary criminology to better explain and predict
crime by integrating certain theories. Criminological theory provides a framework to
guide a researcher to more accurate explanations and predictions of crime. Critics of
criminology are quick to point out that there has yet to be a theory that can explain and
predict all crime (Clarke, 1980; Gibbs, 1987). In fact, Edwin Sutherland, a pioneer of
criminology, was often criticized by fellow sociologists for his emphasis on
criminological theory. However, criminological theory does have the potential to explain
key principles of criminality. The right approach must be discovered first.
The goal of this research is to integrate two closely connected theories in an
attempt to better explain certain types of crime (those unrelated to passion). The theories
that have been integrated in this study are derived from the classical school of
criminological thought. The classical school of criminology was based on the
assumption that criminal activity can be deterred through formal sanctions associated
with punishment. Classical theorists considered the threat of punishment to be as much
of a deterrent factor as actual punishment.
This integrative study examines the application of deterrence and rational choice
theory simultaneously. Contemporary viewpoints are also applied in this study. The
overall goal, after full integration of deterrence and rational choice theory, is to share a
new outlook on the classical school of criminology. The theories themselves are not
outdated; the theories have merely been associated with research that has cast a
somewhat negative light on them. In fact, there are some researchers (Andenaes, 1975;
1

Paternoster, 1989) who are trying to use classical theories in different contexts compared
to how researchers previously used the theories.
This study will use deterrence and rational choice theory to test whether the
certainty and severity of punishment will deter individuals from committing an illegal
act, in this case, illegally parking. Deterrence stems from society’s intolerance towards
certain behavior (criminal). Rational choice theory comes mostly from the concept of a
cost/benefit analysis. It is assumed that humans are rational thinkers who delve into a
cost/benefit analysis before participating in most activities, including their involvement in
illegal behavior. For instance, before a person decides to purchase an item, he or she
evaluates costs and benefits. If an individual deems the item to be more beneficial to him
or her than the cost of the item, it is worth purchasing the item. There are exceptions,
however, particularly when dealing with crimes of passion. This fact is taken into
consideration. This research is beyond the scope of this instant to explain or predict
crimes of passion.
The use of illegal parking is not new to the examination of deterrence theory.
Chambliss (1966) examined faculty violation of campus parking regulations. The
campus atmosphere before the study was carried out was defined as follows: the severity
of punishment was incredibly low ($1) and the certainty of punishment was equally low
(no means of regular enforcement). After a new set of sanctions were implemented
(more certainty and severity of punishment), 35% of those who had been illegally parking
on a regular basis refrained from doing so after the sanctions changed. Obviously, a level
of restrictive deterrence was at work.

2

In this study, parking offenses at The University of Memphis are used to examine
the conditions under which people are more likely to commit offenses. This study also
tests the effect of certainty and severity in accordance with deterrence theory. After
reviewing research on previous studies testing deterrence, it was found that celerity is not
significant in regards to deterring individuals (Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001). In light of these
findings, celerity will be omitted from this study.
Research Questions
This study is designed to address the following research questions: does the
severity of a penalty deter illegal parking, does having certainty of punishment deter
illegal parking, does being punished deter students from recidivating and parking illegally
in the future, does the level of urgency for getting a parking spot make a difference in the
decision to illegally park, and is student classification a factor in violating rules and
regulations? Other factors considered in the analysis are gender, age, race, major,
employment, residential status, and whether or not the student is a student athlete, and if
so, for which sport. It is a common assumption that some students are treated more
favorably when it comes to receiving a parking ticket. This controlling factor will allow
for clarification as to the validity of that assumption. As a final consideration, does an
individual’s perceived likelihood of being caught matter in his or her decision to park
illegally?

3

Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
Deterrence
The two theories that are examined in this study come from the classical school of
thought: deterrence and rational choice. According to Beccaria, crime occurs when the
benefits of the crime outweigh the costs of committing a crime (as cited in Brown,
Esbensen, & Geis, 2007). This statement by Beccaria is often referred to as the main
point of focus derived from the classical school. Beccaria believed that the essence of
crime was to harm society (Beccaria, 1764/1963). Beccaria also stated that it is better to
prevent crime than to punish crime (Beccaria, 1764/1963). Deterrence was the
prevention method that Beccaria discussed in his book On Crimes and Punishments. The
threat of punishment should be used to manipulate behavior. There are three premises
that must hold true in order for deterrence theory to have a solid framework. First, people
are rational. Second, behavior is a product of an individual’s free will. Lastly, people are
hedonistic.
People who are rational use logic in their decision making process. The goal of
reaching pleasure, as well as avoiding pain, is central to an individual’s decision making
processes. Therefore, there is a cost/benefit analysis that often precedes action when an
individual is thinking about committing a crime. If the benefits outweigh the costs, an
individual is more likely to offend than if the costs outweigh the benefits of committing a
crime.
There are three principles of punishment that Beccaria noted as the trademark of
deterrence theory: certainty, severity, and celerity. Beccaria stated that if the proper
4

manipulation of these elements were implemented, then crime could be prevented
(Beccaria, 1764/1963). If people do not believe in the negative consequences for
violating a law, then they are less likely to conform to legal mandates of the law.
Research has seemed to indicate that the most important of the three principles is
certainty, particularly when the level of certainty reaches a critical level (Rowe & Tittle,
1974). If the level of certainty of punishment decreases, then the probability of law
violations will increase. Severity is a major key principle as well. One point that
Beccaria makes is central to the current study. Beccaria stated that the severity of
punishment must be justifiable. He further states, “For a punishment to attain its end, the
evil which it inflicts has only to exceed the advantage derivable from the crime…. All
beyond this is superfluous and for that reason tyrannical.” (Beccaria, 1764/1963)
There are two types of deterrence: general and specific. General deterrence is the
focus when punishment is designed to alter the behavior of individuals who are not the
target of punishment. The offender is used as an example of what could happen if other
individuals choose to commit the crime. Specific deterrence focuses on the specific
person who committed a crime. It is used to dissuade that person from committing future
offenses.
Some contemporary criminologists (Cameron & O’Conner, 2002) have attempted
to discredit classical deterrence theory. Currently, the field of criminology is dominated
by sociological perspectives about crime (Chicago School of Thought). Labeling
theorists are quick to dismiss deterrence theory. Deterrence theory states that punishment
diminishes crime. On the contrary, labeling theory posits that punishment can increase
crime. These theories seem to discredit one another. Either one of the positions is
5

correct or there is a medium to be achieved. In contemporary deterrence research, the
punishment fitting the crime is believed to be of vital importance. Therefore, discrediting
a theory on outdated preconceived notions may not achieve the best results.
Enrico Ferri (1901/1968), a positivist, stated that we have but to look within us to
see that the criminal code is far from being a remedy against crime, that it remedies
nothing. Barnes and Teeters stated that the claim for deterrence is belied by both history
and logic (as cited by Brown et al., 2007). Reckless stated that deterrence does not
prevent crime in others or prevent relapse into crime (as cited by Brown et al., 2007).
Another criticism of deterrence theory concerns the large number of people who
are in prison for the third, fourth, or nth times. Recidivists seemingly demonstrate that
deterrence alone did not work. However, deterrence cannot be totally disregarded as a
theory because there may be just as many cases in which deterrence has worked. If a
driver received a ticket on a certain road, the next time the driver is on that road he or she
is less likely to speed. The driver will be more conscientious about speeding to avoid
potential punishment.
Since deterrence is not easily observed, it is equally difficult to measure. Critics
point to the people who are getting into trouble or have gotten into trouble. This is
measureable. However, these theorists do not think about all the people who have not
committed a crime or those who have committed a crime and have been punished once
and did not recidivate. It is more challenging to measure whether deterrence was at work
when deciding to commit a crime, or not commit a crime, than it is to measure some of
the other criminological factors (socioeconomic variables and prior criminal history).
When deterrence theory is examined, there is only one obvious way to say that it is
6

absolutely working. There would have to be a complete absence of crime. This
utilitarian view is flawed. Therefore, critics should be not so quick to discard deterrence
theory. Deterrence theory, when applied correctly, can be an effective tool in preventing
crime. Since there is no way to get rid of crime, we must try to curb crime. It is known
that certainty and severity of punishment deter some crime (Paternoster, 1987).
Therefore, deterrence theory is useful.
There are also believers in rehabilitation who think that it should be the main
focal point of reducing crime. However, Robert Martinson’s (1975) summary of research
became the driving factor of a strong anti-rehabilitation movement. Martinson’s findings
were summed up by this paragraph.
We know almost nothing about the “deterrent effect,” largely because “treatment”
theories have so dominated our research, and “deterrence” theories have been
relegated almost to the status of a historical curiosity. Since we have almost no
idea of the deterrent functions that our present system performs or that future
strategies might be made to perform, it is possible that there is indeed something
that works – that to some extent is working right now in front of our noses, and
that might be made to work better – something that deters rather than cures,
something that does not so much reform convicted offenders as prevent criminal
behavior in the first place. (Martinson, Kreager, Huizinga, 1975, p. 224)
Deterrence theory should be given another try. However, this time it should be
applied as it was originally intended to be used by Beccaria. The punishment should fit
the crime. There should be an stronger emphasis on crime prevention as Baccaria stated
that crime prevention is the most efficient and effective way to deal with crime.
7

Rational Choice
Rational choice ties in with deterrence theory very nicely. Perceptions of the
probability of punishment are analyzed in this theory. An individual’s perception of
anything, whether correct or not, is a driving factor that influences his or her actions.
According to W. I. Thomas, “Individuals differentiated in what ways and placed in what
situations react in what patterns of behavior, and what behavioral changes in situations?”
(as cited by Timasheff, 1967, p. 178). Thomas also stated, “The behavior in the situation,
the changes brought about in the situation, and the resulting change in behavior represent
the nearest approach the social scientist is able to make to the use of experiment in social
research…” Thomas was known for his research concerning individuals’ perceptions in
association with decision making.
Rational choice theory expands on deterrence theory in many ways. Also, the
choices of potential offenders are considered as well as the choices of victims. Rational
choice assumes that rationality is the driving factor in the decision making process.
Rational choice theory is pertinent to victims of crimes as well. Willits and Wadsworth
(2007) presented a paper that examined convenience store robberies between 1998 and
2005 in the state of New Mexico. Over 1,500 police reports were used to better
understand offender and victim decision making processes. The narrative of the incident
reports were helpful to the researchers in obtaining pertinent offender and victim actions
that were associated with “success and failure.”
There have been more variables incorporated when researching rational choice
theory than there were with deterrence theory. This is probably due to the fact that
rational choice is newer than deterrence theory. The type of crime plays a role in rational
8

choice theory. Individuals choose what type of crime to commit based on many factors.
Planning starts to play a huge role in offending when rational choice theory is examined.
Rational choice is becoming one of the most researched theoretical premises.
Michael Hechter and Satoshi Kanazawa (1997) found that in 1957 there were zero
articles published in the American Political Science Review that utilized rational choice
theory. However, in 1992, nearly 40% of all articles published in American Political
Science Review used rational choice theory in some form or another.
Herrnstein (1990) stated that rational choice theory remains unequaled as a
normative theory. Thus, all academic disciplines dealing with behavior increasingly rely
on the idea that humans tend to maximize utility. Many areas of study within
criminology have been formed by using the rational choice theory. Victimization,
defensible space designs, crime displacement, hot spots, and routine activities have all
been researched with the assistance of rational choice theory. Every action is met with
the perceived reaction that the individual will have to deal with. It is the perceived act
versus the perceived consequence that determines one’s cost/benefit analysis, not the
actual act versus the actual consequence.
Crime prevention is a relatively new term in the realm of criminology. Rational
choice theory is deeply embedded in the roots of all research associated with crime
prevention and crime control policies. Cornish and Clarke (1987) examine this dynamic
by developing the concept of “choice-structuring properties.” Choice-structuring
properties include opportunities, costs, and benefits. The analysis of crime displacement
is observed with particular attention to rational choice theory.
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Boudon (1998) wrote an article incorporating some of the researched limitations
of rational choice theory. Here is an example: One of the main benefits of rational choice
theory is “rational action is its own explanation.” However, some would argue that
actions are not rational. A postulate in rational choice theory is that individual action is
instrumental. Boudon goes on to say that many sociologists have researched and found
that all individual action is not instrumental. Boudon offers his solution to this criticism:
One may promote the generality of Rational Choice Theory by supposing that
actions that appear to be noninstrumental are actually instrumental at a deeper
level. This conversion from noninstrumental to instrumental is obtained by
introducing the postulate that, contrary to appearances, beliefs are the product of
self-interest. (p. 818)

10

Chapter 3
Literature Review
Analysis of Perceived Danger
A study by McCarthy and Hagan (2005) examined danger. Specifically, their
study looked at the role that perceptions about danger played in association with
involvement in theft, drug selling, and prostitution among homeless youth. The
hypothesis in McCarthy and Hagan’s study said that perceptions of crime’s potential
danger influence offending. A large portion of victims of crime fight back against their
assailants. Some offenders often did not commit a crime due to fear of physical harm
being done to them. Conversely, some offenders said that they committed the crimes
because they did not feel as if their victim posed any danger to them at all. In accordance
with deterrence theory, the violence that sometimes ensues during a crime can be more
certain, severe, and swift than the actual legal sanctions for committing the crime in the
first place. The researchers in this study argue that some people incorrectly included
many factors about committing a crime in the same cost/benefit analysis. McCarthy and
Hagan said that the perception of danger is a different analysis altogether when compared
to the perceptions about a crime’s excitement, profit, or other considerations.
This was not a new idea. A classicist by the name of Jeremy Bentham said that
danger played an important role in the “hedonistic calculus” people use in making
decisions (McCarthy & Hagan, 2005). Bentham said that danger is nothing but the
chance of pain (Bentham, 1789/1996, p. 144). Also, researchers have to consider that not
all cultures have the same outlook on pleasure and pain. However, physical harm may be
one of the only consequences that (nearly) all social groups and cultures agree is
11

undesirable (Jaeger, 2001, p.88). In virtually all societies, physical harm to any human
being is seen as a negative action.
McCarthy and Hagan’s (2005) study differs from many other related studies
because they do not use arrest, incarceration, other state penalties, or other formal
sanctions as measurement tools for perceptions of a crime’s cost. However, when
economic and social marginalization minimize a person’s ties to normative society and
can encourage the view that crime is a legitimate means for meeting someone’s goal
(McCarthy & Hagan, 2005), formal sanctions do not have as high of an impact because
these individuals do not have a social stigma to avoid. Therefore, the threat of danger
may be the only thing preventing some types of offenders from committing a crime.
McCarthy and Hagan took data from a study of Toronto and Vancouver, Canada,
street youth in 1992. The respondents all came from different types of service agencies
and street locations where the homeless are often found. Four hundred and eighty-two
youth filled out a self-report questionnaire. There were three waves of data, with only
53% completing all three waves. The independent variable was the perceived danger of
various crimes. One of the cost variables measured the perceptions of the likelihood of
formal sanctions for an offense. Another cost variable asked for perceptions about the
unacceptability of particular crimes. Also, the perceived potential return from a crime
was asked. There were a large variety of control variables including family background,
parental unemployment, and maternal drug addiction. There were three dependent
variables: frequency of committing theft, drug selling since leaving home, and number of
times the respondent sold sex since leaving home.
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The results confirmed the author’s expectations (a rational choice approach was
taken in regards to most of the crimes). There were many examples of accounts of
physical hazards of offending. Victim retribution was a common theme, especially with
theft crimes. Some offenders even mentioned other perceived physical threats that had
nothing to do with people. Some offenders brought up dogs and their fear of being bitten.
Police brutality seemed to be a deterrent as well. Some offenders reported being attacked
by their own clients, especially those who sold sex.
It was clear by these researchers’ findings that a rational choice approach was
taken by offenders when deciding on whether or not to commit a crime. Perceived costs
and benefits are analyzed by offenders before they commit themselves to illegal activity.
Danger and physical harm were also considered when offenders were thinking about
committing a crime.
These researchers clearly highlighted the value of perception in relationship to a
cost/benefit analysis. Danger means different things to different people. Thus, the
analysis will be different for everyone. However, there is one constant. An analysis will
take place during these types of crime. The next research topic looks at two postulates of
deterrence theory, certainty and severity.
Threat of Punishment: Likelihood or Severity?
A study by Cook (1980) examined three questions. First, what factors influence
the rate at which active criminals commit crimes? Second, which dimension of the threat
of punishment has a greater deterrent effect- likelihood or severity? Lastly, what effect
does the threat of punishment for one type of crime have on involvement in other
criminal activities?
13

As Cook (1980) stated, “The core concern of deterrence research has been to
develop a scientific understanding of the relationship between the crime rate and the
threat of punishment generated by the criminal justice system.” Cook made a good
argument in trying to combat deterrence critics. Critics are quick to discount deterrence
theory because they believe the criminal justice system has little impact on crime rates. If
that is in fact true, why do we not just do away with the police and eliminate all illegal
sanctions? One might say that crime would be rampant. Therefore, there is a deterrence
effect. The question should not be if deterrence has an effect, but what is the effect
deterrence plays in society? Deterrence has a role to play, whether formally or not.
There is one general consensus in society when talking about criminals. Most
people do want to see criminals punished. The question is to what degree should they be
punished as appropriateness dictates? This question is greatly hindered by yet another
question. How do we accurately assess the marginal deterrent effects of changes in the
certainty and severity of the punishment? This factor is not easily measured or accounted
for in research.
There was one study of New York City subways in which large increases in
police patrol activity were effective in reducing robberies (Chaiken, Lawless, &
Stevenson, 1974). The increase in the likelihood of arrest for attempted airline hijacking
that resulted from the airport security measures adopted in 1973 almost eliminated this
type of crime (Landes, 1978).
Cook (1980) talked about a rational potential criminal. He said that an increase in
the probability or severity of punishment for a particular type of crime, or both, will
reduce the rate at which that crime is committed, other things being equal. Potential
14

criminals will weigh in a cost benefit analysis, and take advantage of a criminal
opportunity only if it is in their best interest to do so. If their perception of the benefits
and costs of committing a crime are unfavorable to them, then they will abstain from
committing the illegal act in question.
Cook (1980) looked at reasons why individuals responded differently to
equivalent criminal opportunities. Individuals differ in their willingness to accept risks.
Individuals differ with respect to “honesty preference”- the strength of their preference
for behaving in a law-abiding manner. Individuals differ with respect to their evaluation
of the “profit” to be gained from a crime. Individuals differ in their objective
circumstances: their income, the value they place on their time, their skills in committing
crimes successfully and evading capture, and their reputation in the community. All of
these factors are valued differently by individual persons. Therefore, the issue becomes a
little more complex.
Cook (1980) examined the visible presence of enforcers. He said, “The proximity
of police emits a potent signal that the probability of arrest for a crime committed in the
immediate vicinity is high” (p. 223). Cook talked about the effects that security guards
have on deterring would-be robbers. When the chance of apprehension increases the
likelihood of offense decreases.
Cook (1979) developed a model that simulated the criminal behavior of a
population of robbers. There were three main features of this model. First, at any time, a
robber’s perception of arrest and punishment is influenced by his own recent experience
and that of a few “friends.” If his and his “friend’s” recent experiences went well, then
their perception of getting caught decreased which made actually committing the crime
15

more amenable to him. Second, even if the true effectiveness of the system remains
constant, there is considerable turnover among active robbers: robbers are deterred and
“undeterred” according to their own experiences and those of their friends. Lastly, an
increase in the true effectiveness of the system results in a corresponding increase in the
mean of robbers’ perceptions of effectiveness, and an increase in the number of robbers
who are deterred.
Cook (1979) describes the vast majority of the criminal population as
opportunistic with respect to property crimes. Individuals see an advantage point and
make the best of it. The key is to try to eliminate as many of the opportunities for
criminality as possible. There were two limiting factors derived from Cook’s study: the
opportunity cost of time and the effects of increased income on the willingness to take
risks. CPTED (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) is derived from these
principles.
Cook’s (1979) study was a massive literature review in which he focused on
deterrence and rational choice studies. He analyzed the findings from all the studies and
gave critiques where he thought the studies could have been improved. His conclusions
derived from all of the sources studied gave him basis for his ideas on threat of
punishment.
These researchers examined certainty and severity of punishment to gauge which
is more important. Cook’s (1979) research suggested that when offenders have a
heightened since of certainty of punishment, the likelihood of offending drops
substantially. The next section looks at classical criminology in a new light.
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The Revival of Deterrence: General Prevention
A study by Andenaes (1975) reviewed literature to describe a revitalized approach
in deterrence theory. Andenaes talked about how for many years deterrence theory was
not highly thought of in the field of criminology. In the middle of the 1960s there was a
massive amount of literature published that gave a slightly different outlook on
deterrence theory. This research implied that maybe deterrence theory should be
revisited in the search of explaining and predicting crime.
For the greater part of the twentieth century, rehabilitation and treatment have
been the dominant approach in criminology. Andenaes points out that these approaches
were just wishful thinking. We have yet to find a way to rehabilitate offenders.
Treatment has made very little difference in the rate of recidivism. We do not know what
the proper time frame is to release an offender so that he or she does not recidivate. Also,
many people point to the fact that once humans are grown they are set in their ways, both
positive and negative. Therefore, some people view rehabilitation as a waste of time and
money. These people believe that if children are not prevented from being criminal then
they will never really be “fixed” as an adult. Also, some believe that there is an “aging
out of crime” process that takes place. The problem with this notion is that the damage is
already done.
For many, deterrence theory has always had such a negative connotation to it.
Whenever people hear the word deterrence, they automatically think of harsh
punishment. Deterrence has been chastised as being primitive and brutal. However,
deterrence is not so simplistic. The threat of punishment can be just as big of a factor in a
cost/benefit analysis as the actual punishment. Andenaes looked at two primary
17

questions. How much new insight have we gained? How useful is this insight for
purposes of criminal policy?
Economists have been the driving force behind the new deterrence approach.
They have added two aspects to the field. First, the economists assume that crime is the
outcome of a rational choice. They believe that the reduction of crime would follow an
increase in the costs of crime. Secondly, economists have used an application of nonexperimental, statistical models and methods.
General deterrence theory has always been associated with three principles,
certainty, severity, and celerity. In this study by Andenaes (1975), there is a new
principle entertained. The perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system and of the
particular statute under examination is said to be a factor in criminality as well. This new
“fourth deterrence principle” may be the most important yet.
Andenaes (1975) hammered home the concept of the threat of punishment instead
of actual punishment. He said, “If the threat itself is 100 per cent effective, there will be
no violation” (p. 342). He said that deterrence theory should not be discredited on a
simple usage of inaccurate terminology.
Andenaes (1975) talked about the problems with “change in legislation” research.
These are studies that have to be comparisons over time. The studies are a sort of before
and after research design. First, it is difficult to identify the impact of the change among
all the other factors which have been involved at the same time. Secondly, there is a
huge amount of crime that is simply not reported. The usage of victimization studies
must be implemented to attempt to supplement data. Modern research has started doing
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this but it is still relatively new to research and should allow for much higher
“generalizability” of research findings in the future.
Andenaes (1975) said that survey research was a good way to measure general
prevention. Collecting data on public perceptions and beliefs about the criminal justice
system seemed to be a sensible way to measure the effect of the threat of punishment.
Andenaes talked about one of the best known studies on public awareness by Miller et al.
(1971). The level of awareness in the general population concerning the maximum
penalties for different crimes was very low. If penalties are to deter, we must assume that
members of society know what the penalties are (Miller et al., 1971). If the knowledge of
the penalties is poor, deterrence cannot work.
These researchers show a new outlook on deterrence theory. There was some
research unfavorable to the classical school of criminology. This led to an increase in the
rehabilitation movement in criminology. However, the research associated with this
movement has been negative as well. Therefore, it is only fair that classical theories be
reexamined and be made applicable again. The next section of research examines choice.
To offend or not to offend, that is the question.
Deterrence and the Rational Choice Model: Imperfectly Informed Choice
Paternoster’s (1989) study began with an overview of deterrence theory’s three
propositions: certainty, severity, and celerity. Paternoster criticized classic and
contemporary deterrence theorists for not specifying the specific offending decisions that
are expected to be affected by subjective assessments of the certainty and severity of
punishment.
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Paternoster (1989) stated that the problem lies in the fact that deterrence
researchers have not recognized that persons make several kinds of offending decisions
that may be differentially affected by a given set of explanatory factors. The decision to
participate in a crime comes first. Paternoster said that deterrence researchers have to
determine the effect of sanction threats for a group of people. Also, why do some
commit an offense and others do not during a given period of time? The decision to
participate or not is measurable. Some call this the “prevalence of involvement”
(Blumstein & Graddy, 1982). Studying non criminals may lead to important information
that we are missing.
Paternoster (1989) referred to potential offenders who have previously not
offended and those who have already committed an offense. Deciding whether to offend
or not is the focal point. This is called a current participation decision. There are those
with no previous offense history who decide to offend for the first time. This is called an
initial participation decision. The next decision concerned whether or not a person
repeats offending. This is called a continuation decision. This continuation decision is
what drives all of the research based on why people recidivate.
Paternoster (1989) explained the rational choice model of offending in this way.
People make conscious decisions to offend based upon information about offenses and
decisions which have outcomes they believe will be beneficial or profitable to them. The
problem is that people are not making an informed choice. If their perceived calculation
in their cost/benefit analysis is wrong, then their conclusion derived from the analysis
will be incorrect also.
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There are several background factors that could potentially influence the decision
to offend. The strength of affective ties is one factor. Another factor is the cost of
material deprivations or investments made in conformity. Supportive social groups and
opportunities for offending play a role. Informal social costs and perceptions of formal
legal sanctions can also sway the decision to offend. Lastly, moral beliefs about the
appropriateness of such actions can be a factor.
Paternoster (1989) said that there are other features of the rational choice model
that should be noted. First, it is assumed that although all offending is based upon
informed choice, the specific informational factors that affect such decisions vary by
offense. Secondly, it is assumed that the magnitude of the effect for each of the factors
may be different not only for different offenses but also for different types of offending
decisions. Lastly, although each of the specified explanatory factors is presumed to
affect the participation decision at different levels, it cannot be specified in advance
which factors most strongly affect which decisions and each decision must be separately
modeled.
The data for this study came from students who were attending nine public high
schools in and around a mid-sized southeastern city. Confidential questionnaires were
administered to all 10th grade students at the beginning of the 1981-1982 school year.
Over 99 % of the 2,700 students agreed to participate. A follow-up questionnaire was
given to the same students on two subsequent occasions: once their junior year and once
their senior year. Forty-six percent of the students completed all three years of
questionnaires and were the data analyzed for their study.
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The independent variables were categorized into seven different areas of a
rational choice perspective: background factors, affective ties, material considerations,
opportunities, informal sanctions, formal sanctions, and moral beliefs. The dependent
variables were the student’s involvement in four common delinquent offenses: marijuana
use, underage drinking, theft, and vandalism.
There was one clear finding from the study. The decision to offend for the first
time is unrelated to the effect of perceived certainty and severity of punishment. Those
who were more likely to participate in the four delinquent acts were males who have
weaker moral inhibitions against offending, males who experience lax parental
supervision, and males who were more likely to socialize with peers than those who
continued to abstain.
There were only two variables that had a significant effect on three of the four
offenses: gender and parental supervision. The decision to drink liquor under age was
affected by opportunity considerations: social activities, parental supervision, and peer
sanctions. However opportunity factors did not have an effect on the two forms of
opportunity factors.
Marijuana use and vandalism were consistent with the deterrence doctrine. A
change in perceived certainty was significantly related to the decision to desist from
offending for vandalism. Changes in moral tolerance of an act were associated with the
decision to quit offending.
Paternoster made three assumptions to try to explain his findings. First, the
juvenile justice system is generally lenient in the imposition of meaningful sanctions on
even the most serious offenders. Secondly, the offenses examined here are minor ones
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which these youths could reasonably expect would not carry heavy sanctions even if they
were arrested. Lastly, the deterrent effect of formal legal sanctions may be dwarfed by
the “nonlegal” consequences of apprehension and arrest and by such considerations as
moral beliefs.
These researchers make an important distinction involving choice. People do
make choices based on information. However, the information is not always accurate
and is sometimes biased. This leads to a decision being made that has a higher chance of
error or mistake. The next section of research examines a rational choice diagram.
Perceived Risk and the Rational Choice Model
A study by Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga (2006) looked at the perceived risks
of committing crimes. An important subjective cost of crime is the perceived risk of
formal sanction. The question is do individuals with higher perceptions of the risk of
punishment commit fewer criminal acts?
Some research suggested that perceived rewards dominate costs in criminal
decision making, presumably because criminals discount formal punishment due to its
long time horizon (Piliavin, Gartner, Thornton, & Matsueda, 1986). Rational choice
theory assumes that risk perceptions are rooted, at least to some degree, in reality.
Matsueda et al. (2006) used a Bayesian learning model in this study. It is based
on Bayes’ probability theorem. This theory states that individuals begin with a prior
subjective probability of an event, such as the risk of arrest, based on all the information
they have accumulated to that point. New information is then collected. This new
information is used to update their probability estimates. This is called the posterior
probability.
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Matsueda et al. (2006) specified three sources of information from which
individuals update their perceptions of risk of arrest. Some sources of information come
from their own experiences with offending, including getting arrested and avoiding
arrest. Their knowledge of friends’ experiences with offending would be another source.
Lastly, their social structural location can be a source. For example, different
socioeconomic groups may not share the same collective efficacy or perception for
particular crimes.
The first hypothesis in this study had to do with prior perceived risk. Future
perceived risk is a positive function of prior perceived risk plus any updating. Another
hypothesis had to do with Bayesian learning based on personal experience with arrest.
Net of prior risk, experienced certainty of arrest is positively and monotonically
associated with perceived risk of arrest. Hypothesis 3 had to do with the Bayesian
learning based on personal experience with crime. Unsanctioned offenses are negatively
and monotonically associated with perceived risk of arrest. Hypothesis 4 had to do with
the shell of illusion. Compared to experienced offenders, naïve individuals overestimate
the risk of arrest. Hypothesis 5 had to do with Bayesian learning based on vicarious
experience. Delinquent peers are negatively associated with perceived risk of arrest. The
sixth hypothesis had to do with social structure and perceived risk. Perceived risk is
shaped by location in the social structure. Hypothesis 7 had to do with deterrence. Crime
is reduced by perceptions of greater risk of formal sanction weighted by perceived utility
of the sanction. Hypothesis 8 had to do with opportunity costs. Crime is reduced by
opportunity costs, including schooling and work. Hypothesis 9 had to do with psychic
returns to crime. Criminal behavior is associated with perceived probability of
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excitement and social status from crime weighted by perceived utility of the excitement
or status. Hypothesis 10 had to do with criminal opportunities. Criminal behavior is
increased by perceptions of opportunities to get away with crime. Hypothesis 11 had to
do with limited rationality and discounting. Criminal behavior is associated with
perceptions of immediate criminal opportunities and rewards, but not by perceptions of
future punishment. The last hypothesis had to do with instrumental versus expressive
crimes. Rational choice and deterrence have stronger effects on theft than violence.
The data came from the Denver Youth Survey. The total sample included 1,459
respondents. Risks, returns, and opportunities were measured from the youth reports.
There were two variables measured with the respect to perceived risk of arrest:
experienced certainty and unsanctioned offenses.
On average, females believed the chances of arrest for theft were 11% higher than
males did. Each year of age was associated with a decrease of 4% in perceived risk for
theft and 1% for violence. Youth with siblings perceived a lower risk of arrest for
violence.
On average, as unsanctioned offenses increased, certainty of arrest declined.
Compared to naïve offenders, high offenders (10 or more offenses) perceived the risk of
arrest for violence about 10% lower. Delinquency by peers was associated with lower
perceptions of certainty of arrest.
Males and high impulsive individuals engaged in more theft and violence. Older
youth reported more violence. Blacks engaged in more violence but not theft. Prior
violence and theft exerted strong lagged effects on future violence and theft. Youth who
liked to do daring things were more likely to steal and fight.
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In conclusion, Matsueda et al. (2006) found support for deterrence and a rational
choice model. When dealing with crimes unrelated to passion, the rational choice model
seemed to prevail. Furthermore, Matsueda et al. said that they believe that the rational
choice model could be complementary to any institutional theories. This notion further
fuels the progression of criminology into integrating theories to better explain and predict
different types of crime. An example of a rational choice model is Figure 1.
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Rational Choice Model
Neighborhood
Concentrated Disadvantage
Mobility
Percent Black
Crime Rate

New Information
Individual
Delinquent Peers
Age
Experienced Certainty
Sex
Unsanctioned Offenses
Race
Family Structure
Impulsivity
Family Income
Risk Preference

Baseline Risk

Updated Risk

Perceived Risk

Perceived Risk

Figure 1
Source: Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga (2006)
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Matsueda et al. (2006) used a Bayesian method of analysis to describe an
individual’s cost/benefit analysis. The chart above is an example of how many factors
help influence someone’s decision making process over a given time. Special attention
should be given to the perceived risk portion of the chart. This perceived risk is
commonly updated to create an updated perceived risk. This shows the cost/benefit
analysis changing literally to the very second of committing a criminal act. The next
section of research examines a rational choice approach in accordance with curbing
airline hijackings.
A Rational Choice Model: Airline Hijackings
A study by Dugan et al. (2005) looked at attempted hijackings that occurred
around the world. The researchers used continuous-time analysis to estimate the impact
of many counter hijacking interventions. The analysis included different ways in which
the offenders were motivated. Regression analysis was used to show some of the
predictors of successful hijackings.
A rational choice model was used to guide their research questions. The
researchers wanted to know if the hazard (risk) of a new hijacking attempt increases or
decreases when the certainty of apprehension was increased. Will the hazard of new
hijacking attempts increase shortly after earlier attempts? Will the hazard of new
hijacking attempts be greater following a series of successful hijackings?
The data in this study came from United States and foreign countries’ airports
from 1931 through 2003. Supplemental data were also added by an additional 39
hijacking cases that were identified from publicly available data from RAND. The
hijackings were divided into two types: terrorist and other related hijackings.
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After the metal detectors were implemented, hijacking attempts went down,
except for those related to terrorism. The hazard for another hijacking decreased
significantly if the current and previous hijackings were attempted in a short period of
time. If the three most recent events were primarily successful and close together, the
hazard of a new hijacking attempt increased for the full sample as well as for the nonUnited States and non-terrorist hijackings.
The hazard of hijacking decreased substantially after this policy was enacted for
both Cuban and United States’ flights. Nearly three out of five flights diverted to Cuba
originated from the United States.
Policies and stricter punishment seemed to have an effect on hijackers, except
those with terrorist ideals. If the certainty of apprehension was increased, the chance of
another hijacking attempt went down. The rate of hijacking went up significantly
following a series of successful hijackings but declined following a series of unsuccessful
hijacking attempts. Metal detectors and increased surveillance significantly reduced the
number of non terrorist related hijacking attempts.
One limitation in this study was the fact that the offenders’ motivations were not
known in all the cases. These motivations would have been useful to know because how
the offenders viewed the policy changes could have been a factor in their reasoning for
committing the act or not. Also, with the policies changing at about the same time, it
makes it hard to tell which had the largest deterrent effect.
This research discusses some of the methods used by airlines to decrease
hijacking attempts. The methods are very closely related to deterrence research. When
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the airlines increase the certainty of hijack detection, the attempts decrease. The next
section of research examines offenders’ decision making.
A Rational Choice Model: Offenders’ Decisions
A study by Clarke and Cornish (1985) said that criminal behavior is the outcome
of an offender’s rational choices and decisions. When this approach was utilized, it had
the most immediate payoff for crime control efforts aimed at reducing criminal
opportunity. Clarke and Cornish chastise theorists who choose to ignore the offender’s
decision making.
According to Taylor, Walton, and Young (1973), a social theory must have
reference to men’s teleology – their purposes, their beliefs and the context in which they
act out these purposes and beliefs. Thus men rob banks because they believe they may
enrich themselves, not because something biologically propels them through the door.
Residential burglary was studied in relationship to the opportunity structure for
crime in a study by Cohen and Felson (1979). As the increased probability for electronic
goods went up, so did the increases in burglary. Also, the increase in numbers of
unoccupied houses increased the number of burglaries. When the opportunity went up,
so did the criminal act.
The economists believe that it is the importance of the concepts of rewards and
costs and their associated probabilities that are the most essential key in explaining
criminal behavior. This economic rationale is also said to be a good explanatory weapon
for the phenomena of displacement and recidivism.
The view of economists is one that says criminals are “deterrable.” Economists
argue that if criminals had to work harder at some types of crimes they would eventually
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feel that committing the crime is not worth the trouble. Unemployment is said to be a
huge factor in crime. If people are less likely to have money, then they are more likely to
innovate illegal means of making their money.
Some psychological studies have shown that even professionals sometimes do not
handle information perfectly at all times to make the best rational decision (Wilkins &
Chandler, 1965). If professionals who are knowledgeable in their own field of study do
not always make the best decisions, then it is logical to infer that people sometimes do
not make the best decisions.
Clarke and Cornish (1985) said that there are two fundamental aspects of crime
that must be contemplated: explaining the involvement of particular individuals in crime
and explaining the occurrence of criminal events. Explaining the occurrence has been
somewhat neglected in criminological research.
When looking at crime through a rational choice perspective, the distinctions
between the two aspects of crime have to be made and analyzed separately. For some
offenses, like shoplifting, it might be easier to regard the first offense as determined by
the multiple factors identified in criminological theory.
Clarke and Cornish (1985) also talk about the need for rational choice models to
be specific to individual crimes. As long as criminologists try to explain crime in a
general way, they will get a general answer. Burglary, for example, should be divided
into two different types: residential and commercial. The crimes may seem similar.
However, there are different factors that can contribute to the potential attempt for each
type of burglary.

31

The 1985 study by Clarke and Cornish was an in-depth qualitative review of a
massive amount of research. Rational choice was examined in great detail. The authors
tried to better define different types of rational choice models. The importance of this
study is great due to the fact that rational choice is not a general approach in criminology.
There are specific models that work for specific types of criminal behavior.
Rational choice theory is used again to observe offenders’ decision making.
Clarke and Cornish (1985) pay special attention to specific types of crimes. There is no
cost/benefit analysis that is uniform in structure. The analyses differ between offender
type and crime type. The next section examines deterrence theory and what deters
criminals.
Restrictive Deterrence: NARC Identification
A study by Jacobs (1996) examined restrictive deterrence. Active street-level
crack dealers were interviewed in field research. Dealers used perceived shorthand to
determine whether buyers in question were “narcs.” This study demonstrated how
interactions among marketplace democratization, marketplace volatility, transactional
brevity, and threats from law enforcement affect its complexity and refinement.
There is a strong case in this study for deterrence being a heavy influencer of a
decision to commit a crime or not commit a crime. The researchers wanted to know what
“red flags” do crack dealers look for when they are attempting to find a buyer? What are
some of the “red flags” that give police away to the crack dealers? What are some of the
tests that crack dealers use when they are not sure whether a prospective buyer is a cop or
not?
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The data gathered in this study came from interviews from forty active street
dealers of crack cocaine who were working out of a medium-sized Midwestern
metropolitan area within a central city with a population of 390,000. Respondents, on
average, did not sell very large amounts of crack. The average crack sale was $20. The
average monthly gross income for the respondents was $2,300. Respondents averaged
selling crack about 5.5 days a week. The estimated number of sales per day per dealer
was about 20. All respondents except four were unemployed. Their average grade
completed in school was tenth grade. Thirty three respondents reported that they lived
with relatives. Seven lived with friends. Thirty four were male. Six were female. All
respondents were African-American. Their average age was a little over 20. All of the
male respondents were active gang members. They all sold for personal profit and did
not seem to be involved in any type of a “drug gang ring.” Interviews were set up in a
semi-structured format which allowed for further probing if needed.
A snowball sample was formed. The first five respondents were recruited by the
researcher himself. Four out of those five became contacts and provided six additional
respondents. Contacts were paid $20 for each referral they made. There were criteria
that each respondent had to meet to be involved in the study. The respondents had to
have “trafficked” at least 4 hours a day, several days a week, for at least six months, to
several different customers per day, and grossed at least $1,300 per month.
One technique that the crack dealers used to differentiate the police from
“legitimate” buyers was asking them to inhale crack smoke through a pipe. Another way
was to give a smaller rock than paid for. The respondents said that true crack heads
would make sure that they got what they paid for. Respondents said that cops were
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unwilling to taste the crack by placing it on their tongues. Another way the dealers
would use would be asking them who they knew in the neighborhood.
Most of the crack dealers were users as well. The ones who had been caught by
police in the past were the ones who had such an addiction that they did not even care to
really examine buyers before selling. For other dealers, if buyers did not fit the “right
appearance,” then they were not sold to even if they were not police. In some cases,
dealers reduced offense frequencies at the cost of withdrawing into their own
transactional circles.
One thing remained fairly consistent throughout the study. Crack dealers did not
want to be caught. This shows strong support for deterrence and rational choice. Using a
cost/benefit analysis, crack dealers were fully aware of what they were doing. It was
illegal, and they tried to refrain from being caught and punished. They screened potential
buyers and in some cases tested potential buyers.
This study examined some of the ways that drug offenders pick up on “narcs.”
This research is relevant in criminological circles in two ways. First, it is helpful for
police to know about these techniques used by criminals to screen “narcs.” Secondly,
this research proves that deterrence theory is at work with these criminals. These
criminals speak of being deterred several times from offending. The common thread
among them is that they offend when they are not deterred.
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Chapter 4
Methodology
This study used a quantitative approach to gather primary data. The unit of
analysis was individual University of Memphis students. This was the one and only
qualifier/disqualifier. If a person was not a student at the University of Memphis during
this study, then he or she was not eligible to participate in this study. This study was
approved by the University of Memphis Institutional Review Board.
After consulting with numerous professors from the University of Memphis
Departments of Criminology and Criminal Justice and English, the target goal for the
sample size was 400. Those two particular departments were chosen because they have a
good cross section of the university’s students. Because the sample in this study was not
randomly chosen, the researcher tried to get more respondents to help with the
generalizability towards this group, at this time, and at this place. The final sample size
was 505.
A non-probability convenience sample was used to gather participants.
Professors were chosen at the convenience of the researcher and were asked if the
questionnaire could be administered in their class. After a professor agreed to let his or
her students participate in the study, a time was selected within the first month of the Fall
2010 semester by the researcher and professor for survey distribution. The consent form
was explained to all the students prior to the distribution of the survey. The students
were told that participation was voluntary and that all results would remain completely
anonymous. Students were asked if they had taken the survey in a previous class. If they
had taken the survey in another class, they were not eligible to retake the survey. The
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questionnaires were handed out in person to help maintain the questionnaire’s integrity.
After the students finished the questionnaire, they passed the surveys to the front of the
class where they were collected. The estimated response rate was 99%. Individuals who
responded by saying they were not at least 18 years old were not included in the analysis.
There were approximately five surveys discarded for this reason.
Variables
The variables employed in this study operationalized deterrence and rational
choice theory. Some of the questions on the questionnaire were more about an
individual’s perception of decision making than an actual decision being made. For
example, one question asked, “What do you perceive the chances are of you receiving a
ticket for parking illegally at the University of Memphis?” This question is not actually
determining the chances of an individual being ticketed for parking illegally. The
question is aimed at measuring an individual’s perception. As noted earlier in this study,
perception can be a key factor in an individual’s decision making process.
Deterrence and rational choice were measured by examining certainty and
severity of punishment. One set of questions asked if the respondent had ever been given
a ticket for illegally parking. The following question asked if the respondent had parked
illegally after being issued a ticket. This is a measurement of classical specific
deterrence. Next, respondents were asked if they would illegally park if the fine was $25.
The next question was exactly the same only the fine was increased to $150. This is one
of the ways severity of punishment was calculated. Another question set examines
severity of punishment as well. Respondents were asked if they would park illegally to
get to a final exam if the fine was $25. The next question also increased the fine to $150.
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Following that set of questions was another set asking if they would park illegally if a
police officer was watching them. The fines were again listed at $25 and $150. Also, the
final exam period was brought into this set of questions since that is when parking
pressures become extreme. Many demographics were included in the study: gender, age,
race, school classification (freshman, sophomore, etc.), major, employment status,
commuter status (living on or off campus), and whether or not the student was an athlete.
Statistics
This study employed a three wave analysis of data. The first wave of analysis
included a frequency distribution of all variables and responses. The second wave of
analysis used a bivariate measure, cross tabulation. Cross tabulation is a non-parametric
test. Even though the non-parametric test is not as powerful as the parametric test, the
sample size suggests that the difference would be minimal.
Chi-Square analysis was chosen to show statistical significance due to its
sensitivity to data. Even though Fisher’s Test gives the exact p-value, Chi-square was
chosen because of the familiarity the researcher has with its functioning capacity. Also,
while Chi-Square cannot give an exact measure of p-value, it can give an approximation
of p-value. The sample size led the researcher towards Chi-Square as well. The higher
the sample size, the less need there is for an exact p-value. Yates’ continuity correction is
often used to make the Chi-Square p-value more accurate. However, some argue that the
correction can “over correct” or go too far. Once again, the size of the sample ruled out
the need for Fisher’s Test and Yates’ continuity correction.
The non parametric bivariate analysis did little to show the effect of several
independent control or intervening variables on the dependent variable. Therefore, the
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findings were somewhat limited. Hence, the analysis progressed into the third and final
wave, logistic regression. Logistic regression served as the multivariate statistical
measuring instrument. Regression was chosen instead of correlation because many of the
variables were presumed to cause a change in another variable. Also, regression offered
the option of manipulating the X variable. OLS (linear regression) was not used due to
three inherent difficulties. Demaris (1995) says that the use of a linear function, the
assumption of independence between the predictors and the error term, and non constant
variance of the errors across combinations of predictor values make OLS a limited
statistical method when using a binary 0 to 1 technique. In addition, Bollen (1989) says
the pseudo-isolation condition requires the error term to be uncorrelated with the
predictor variables.
The researcher chose to have the predictor variables and the error term correlated
in this study. A researcher should not assume a relationship between variables even if the
relationship makes sense theoretically. When the reader glances at the data analysis
section, he or she will see why this is a critical fact to note. If the researcher had assumed
a relationship between predictor variables, then the regression techniques would have
been misleading. The researcher chose to report the error term in all data analyses. This
helps the reader identify the margin of error in each unit of analysis.
Logistic regression is a popular technique employed in the field of social science
due to its sensitivity to an abundance of integral data. Given the nature of the
questionnaire, logistic regression became the most obvious measurement tool. Because
the respondents were forced into dichotomous responses (yes and no) the dependent
variable could only have two values. Also, logistic regression deals in probabilities. The
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survey used in this study asked hypothetical questions and asked specifically about
individuals’ perceptions of what he or she would do in certain situations. Logistic
regression seemed to be a natural fit for the third and final wave of analysis.
Hypotheses
There were an abundance of potential hypotheses that could have been tested
using the data collected for this sample. After looking at all of the raw data, the
researcher believed that these five hypotheses were the best options to test deterrence and
rational choice theories simultaneously. Also, for the purposes of length and time, these
five hypotheses were chosen at this time: Hypothesis 1: The respondents who have been
given a ticket will be less inclined to park illegally again. Hypothesis 2: The respondents
who perceive their chances of being ticketed high will park illegally less often than those
who perceive their chances of getting a ticket low. Offending is increased by perceptions
of the opportunity to park illegally without being ticketed. Hypothesis 3: Respondents
who have never been given a ticket for illegally parking will be more likely to illegally
park to get to their final exam when the fine is $25 than those who have been given an
illegal parking ticket. Hypothesis 4: More respondents will say that they would park
illegally to get to class if the fine was $25 than if the fine was $150. Hypothesis 5: More
respondents will park illegally when a police officer is not watching them and the fine is
$25 than if a police officer is watching them and the fine is $25.
Describing Some of the Data
One side note must be explained about the time period in which the survey was
administered. The survey was administered at the start of a new semester. Parking
spaces were not plentiful. One might even say legal parking spaces were scarce or not
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available to many students at certain times of the day. Two parking lots were under
construction at the time of the survey. One road was closed that was used for parking
prior to the beginning of the new semester. Also, enrollment increased to the highest
level the university had ever achieved. These unique situations combined with the
historically misallocated parking slots/areas led to a potential threat to internal validity.
These unique situations may have been beneficial to the overall response rate to the
study. Students wanted to talk about this hot topic at its most critical point. In fact, some
students took it upon themselves to make written remarks about the parking situation on
campus.
Limitations to the research design were observed. If the sample were larger, it
would better mirror the student population. The respondents in the sample were not
chosen randomly. The sample was a convenience sample.
The University of Memphis
The University of Memphis is located in Memphis, Tennessee. It is an urban
institution for higher education. The student population is estimated to be over 21,000
students. The University of Memphis is fully accredited by the Commission on Colleges
of the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. The University of Memphis
participates in many intercollegiate sports, most notably men’s basketball. The university
has approximately 3,000 residential students. However, the university is largely
comprised of commuter students. The University of Memphis is governed by the
Tennessee Board of Regents.
The University of Memphis has a Parking Services Department. Every vehicle
parked on the University of Memphis campus must have a parking permit displayed on
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the rearview mirror. Vehicles must be parked within the area allotted by white lines on
both sides. Any vehicle violating these two policies will be fined and possibly towed at
the expense of the owner. There are 25 parking violations that the University of
Memphis enforces with fines. These violations can be assessed with fines ranging from
$10 to $200.
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Chapter 5
Data Analysis
Demographic Summary
The gender distribution for the survey (58.4% female to 41.6% male) closely
resembled the University of Memphis student population (61% female to 39% male),
(Common Data Set 2009-2010), and approximately 62% of students were of traditional
college age (18-21). Approximately 38% were non-traditional college age students (older
than 21). The racial breakdown was 55% Caucasian, 38.6% African American, 2.4%
Latino, and 4% other. The school classification breakdown was 18.8% freshman, 29.9%
sophomore, 20.2% junior, 23% senior, and 8.1% graduate. Approximately 49% of the
respondents were criminal justice majors, and 51.5% were non-criminal justice majors.
Approximately 65% of respondents reported that they were employed. Approximately
78% of those who were employed were part-time employees. Almost 80% of
respondents were commuter students. Approximately 7% of the students were athletes.
Summary of Theoretical Responses
About 71% of respondents reported that they had parked illegally before taking
this survey. Approximately 57% reported that they had parked illegally at the University
of Memphis. Approximately 53% of respondents have been given a ticket for illegally
parking. Of those who were given a ticket, approximately 62% have not parked illegally
since the ticket was issued. About 41% of respondents perceived their chances of getting
a ticket low (0-30%), about 29% of respondents perceived their chances of getting a
ticket moderate (31%-69%), and 30.3% of respondents perceived their chances of getting
a ticket high (70-100%). Approximately 57.4% of respondents said that they would not
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park illegally to get to class if the fine was $25. Approximately 98% of respondents said
that they would not park illegally to get to class if the fine was $150. Approximately
87% of respondents said that they would not park illegally to get to class if the fine was
$25 and a police officer was watching. About 98.4% of respondents said that they would
not park illegally to get to class if the fine was $150 and a police officer was watching.
Approximately 80% of respondents said that they would park illegally to get to their final
exam if the fine was $25. About 67.5% of respondents said that they would not park
illegally to get to their final exam if the fine was $150. Approximately 56% of
respondents said that they would park illegally to get to their final exam if the fine was
$25 and a police officer was watching. Approximately 74% of respondents said that they
would not park illegally to get to their final exam if the fine was $150 and a police officer
was watching.
Cross Tabulation of Hypotheses
The data gave no support for hypothesis 1. Those who have been given a ticket
are not less likely to park illegally again. In fact, the data show that an individual who
parks illegally once is more likely to park illegally again regardless of whether or not he
or she was ticketed. A Pearson Chi-Square value expressed the statistical significance of
this finding: X² (1) = 190.419; p < .01.
The data gave no support for hypothesis 2. Offending was not increased by
perceptions of the opportunity to get away with parking illegally. Those who perceived
their chances of getting a ticket for illegally parking low actually parked illegally less
frequently than those who perceived their chances of getting a ticket high. A Pearson
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Chi-Square value expressed the statistical significance of this finding: X² (1) = 18.613; p
< .01.
The data gave no support for hypothesis 3. Those who have never been given a
ticket for parking illegally did not say that they would be more inclined to illegally park
to get to a final exam if the fine is $25. Those who have been exposed to the specific
deterrent (illegal parking ticket) showed no significant difference in their decision to
illegally park when compared to those who have been privy to only general deterrence.
This finding was not statistically significant: X² (1) = 1.725; p > .05.
The data supported hypothesis 4. Approximately 42.6% of respondents said that
they would park illegally to get to class if the fine was $25. Only 2.2% of respondents
said that they would park illegally to get to class if the fine was $150. X² (1) = 10.745; p
< .01.
The data supported hypothesis 5. Approximately 42.6% of respondents said that
they would park illegally to get to class if the fine was $25. About 12.7% of respondents
said that they would park illegally to get to class if the fine was $25 and a police officer
was watching them. Of the respondents who said that they would park illegally to get to
class if the fine was $25, 29.3% would also park illegally to get to class if the police were
watching. Therefore, approximately 70% of respondents said that a police officer
watching them would deter them from parking illegally if the fine was $25. A Pearson
Chi-Square value shows the statistical significance of this finding: X² (1) = 93.457; p <
.01.
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Binary Logistic Regression Techniques
To control for several variables at once, binary logistic regression was used to
show saliency with the dependent variables. Each technique has been labeled with a
number so that there is a distinction made evident for discussion and clarification
purposes of the different regressions. The first (1) binary logistic regression analysis was
performed on the variable “Have you ever parked illegally?” Here is the output table for
regression (1):

Table 1
Variables in the Equation
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
B
Step 1

a

Gender

S.E.

Wald df Sig. Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

.540 .226 5.692

1 .017

1.715

1.101

2.672

Age

-.727 .277 6.899

1 .009

.484

.281

.832

Race

-.011 .224

.002

1 .961

.989

.638

1.534

.280 .106 6.964

1 .008

1.324

1.075

1.630

.404

1 .525

.869

.563

1.340

Employed

.601 .211 8.096

1 .004

1.823

1.206

2.758

Constant

.184 .441

1 .676

1.202

Classification
Major

-.141 .221

.174

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Age, Race, Classification, Major, Employed.

All of the demographic variables were controlled for. Employment status
registered with the highest significance level of .004. B (Beta) was measured at .601
indicating that those who were employed were more likely to illegally park. As visible
by the chart, age, classification, and employment were all statistically significant too.
The Nagelkerke R Square registered the explanation of variance at approximately 14%.
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Lower classmen (Freshman and Sophomores) were more likely to park illegally than
upper classmen. Interestingly enough, a B value of -.727 indicated that individuals age
22 and up were more likely to illegally park than individuals who were between 18 and
21. The B value for gender (.540) indicated that males were far more likely to park
illegally than females.
The second regression (2) was controlling for several variables in response to the
question “Have you ever parked illegally at the University of Memphis?” Here is the
output table:
Table 2

Variables in the Equation
95% C.I.for EXP(B)

Step 1

a

B

S.E.

.247

.205

1.449

1

.229

1.281

.856

1.915

Age

-.038

.238

.026

1

.872

.962

.604

1.533

Race

-.502

.203

6.113

1

.013

.606

.407

.901

.354

.095

13.854

1

.000

1.425

1.182

1.716

-.079

.200

.157

1

.692

.924

.625

1.366

.393

.199

3.898

1

.048

1.481

1.003

2.188

Doyouliveoncampus

-.100

.241

.174

1

.677

.905

.564

1.450

StudentAthlete

-.067

.394

.029

1

.866

.935

.432

2.025

Constant

-.536

.891

.362

1

.548

.585

Gender

Classification
Major
Employed

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Age, Race, Classification, Major, Employed,
Doyouliveoncampus, StudentAthlete.

In this output calculation, race, classification, and employment status were
statistically significant. School classification had the highest level of significance (.000).
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A B value of .354 indicated that lower classmen were much more likely to illegally park
at the University of Memphis than upper classmen. The B value of -.502 indicated that
non-whites were more likely to park illegally at the University of Memphis than whites.
Lastly, employment status again was significantly correlated with parking illegally at the
University of Memphis. The B value of .393 showed that those who were employed were
more likely to park illegally at the University of Memphis than those who were not
working. The Nagelkerke R Square registered the explanation of variance at
approximately 10%.
The third regression (3) was performed on the question “Have you ever been
given a ticket for illegal parking?” Here is the output table for regression (3):

Table 3
Variables in the Equation
95% C.I.for EXP(B)
B
Step 1

a

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

Gender

-.060

.213

.080

1

.778

.942

.621

1.429

Age

-.196

.242

.657

1

.418

.822

.511

1.321

Race

-.949

.213

19.954

1

.000

.387

.255

.587

.491

.099

24.560

1

.000

1.633

1.345

1.983

-.109

.207

.278

1

.598

.896

.597

1.346

.521

.210

6.143

1

.013

1.684

1.115

2.543

Doyouliveoncampus

-.146

.254

.331

1

.565

.864

.526

1.421

StudentAthlete

-.967

.427

5.134

1

.023

.380

.165

.878

Constant

1.086

.947

1.315

1

.251

2.961

Classification
Major
Employed

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Age, Race, Classification, Major, Employed,
Doyouliveoncampus, StudentAthlete.
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School classification and race were the two most significant variables correlated
with this question (.000). A B value of .491 indicated that upper classmen received more
tickets for illegal parking then under classmen did. A B value of -.949 showed that nonwhites received tickets for illegal parking much more frequently than whites. People who
were employed received tickets more frequently than people who were not employed.
Lastly, student athletes received tickets for parking illegally much more often than non
student athletes (B value of -.967). This statistic was unique in the fact that there was a
lot of anecdotal animosity from university staff that student athletes never get ticketed for
illegal parking. These data prove otherwise at least within this sample. The Nagelkerke
R Square registered the explanation of variance at approximately 21%.
The fourth regression technique (4) was run with the dependent variable being
“After receiving a ticket for illegal parking, have you parked illegally again?” Here is the
output chart:
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Table 4

Variables in the Equation
95% C.I.for EXP(B)

Step 1a

B

S.E.

Gender

.398

.220

3.272

1

.070

1.488

.967

2.290

Age

.011

.255

.002

1

.967

1.011

.613

1.668

Race

-.536

.216

6.133

1

.013

.585

.383

.894

.412

.105

15.341

1

.000

1.509

1.228

1.855

-.156

.215

.523

1

.470

.856

.561

1.305

.636

.223

8.112

1

.004

1.889

1.219

2.926

Doyouliveoncampus

-.415

.280

2.195

1

.138

.660

.381

1.143

StudentAthlete

-.832

.413

4.071

1

.044

.435

.194

.976

Constant

-.224

.940

.057

1

.812

.800

Classification
Major
Employed

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Gender, Age, Race, Classification, Major, Employed,
Doyouliveoncampus, StudentAthlete.

The most significant variable in this regression was classification (.000). A -.536
B value showed that upper classmen continued to park illegally after being ticketed at a
much higher rate than under classmen. In fact, approximately 91% of freshmen who had
been given a ticket in the past reported that they had refrained from parking illegally
again. Employment status was significant (.004). A .636 B value indicated that those
who were employed parked illegally more often after receiving a ticket than those who
did not work. Race was a statistically significant factor (.013). A -.536 B value showed
that non-whites were more inclined to park illegally after being ticketed than whites. A B
value of -.832 expressed that student athletes were more likely to park illegally after
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being ticketed than non student athletes. The Nagelkerke R Square registered the
explanation of variance at approximately 15%.
A fifth regression technique (5) was recorded. The dependent variable tested was
“Would you park illegally to get to your final exam if the fine was $25?” More tables
can be found in the Appendices.
Race was a significant factor (.000). A .902 B value expressed that whites were
more inclined to illegally park to get to a final exam when the fine is $25 than nonwhites. Perceived chances of getting a ticket was a significant factor as well (.005). In a
complete counter to rational choice theory, a B value of .418 indicated that as the
perception of getting a ticket increased so did the likelihood of parking illegally to get to
a final exam when the fine was $25.
A number of other binary logistic regression techniques were run testing other
dependent variables but the explanation of variances among responses was so low they
were not reported in the analyses.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
Results of Hypothesis 1
Because the severity of punishment is seemingly so low, respondents who were
more inclined to park illegally did not seem to take into account the $25 fine. This
examination of deterrence and rational choice theory should not serve as a negation of the
theories. Hypothesis 1 primarily is testing specific deterrence. However, the $25 fine is
apparently not a threshold for the majority of respondents to be deterred from illegally
parking to get to class.
When the severity of punishment is increased ($150), respondents who have been
given a ticket before are less likely to park illegally (96.6%). However, when these two
variables are cross tabulated there is no statistical significance between the perceived
offending patterns. Those who have been given a ticket for illegal parking have
approximately the same perceived offending patterns that those who have never been
given a ticket for illegal parking.
Results of Hypothesis 2
Even though prior research suggests otherwise, perceived chances of getting
caught did not appear to be relevant in this study. This could possibly be explained by
the level of punishment. Because the fine is only $25, respondents seemed to not really
care about their chances of getting a ticket when choosing to illegally park. In addition,
those who have never been given a ticket for illegally parking were less likely to illegally
park.
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Another factor could be at work here as well. Those who perceive a low chance
of getting a ticket may have never received a ticket. Therefore, some of those
respondents may not park illegally at any rate. Those who perceive their chances of
getting ticketed as being high may have been given a ticket or multiple tickets in the past.
Some of these respondents may not have been deterred. Therefore, even though they
perceive their chances of getting a ticket high, they do not care because the severity of the
punishment does not correlate with the certainty of punishment.
Results of Hypothesis 3
Once again, a principle of rational choice theory (prior experiences with offending
and punishment tendencies) does not seem to have a significant effect in the respondents’
decision making process. This hypothesis was testing the two types of deterrence as well,
specific and general. It was thought that those who have been ticketed would be less
likely to reoffend. This was not the case. There could be many explanations for this
finding.
First, the hypothesis assumed that there would be future criminality without prior
criminality or being punished for prior criminality. This study has brought an interesting
finding to the author’s attention. Some individuals may be just more likely to offend and
reoffend based on factors not always associated with a rational choice decision making
process.
Secondly, the question was posed in a way to include getting to a final exam.
Some respondents (in this case, students) hear “final exam” and there seems to be a
psychological trigger hit. Students appear to show a common bond or agreement in the
way final exams are viewed. By adding in this extra element to the question, the question
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advertently reverses the common theoretical basis of deterrence and rational choice. This
question does not pose an increase to severity or certainty of punishment. Rather it is an
examination of conditions or circumstances: under which conditions are people more
likely to offend? Apparently, getting to a final exam is a common circumstance that
these respondents shared in which offending was seen as highly necessary or likely.
Lastly, the fine was only $25. When a cross tabulation is run comparing those
who have been given a ticket with whether or not a person would park illegally to get to a
final exam if the fine was $150, there was a noticeable difference in the responses.
Approximately 78% of those who have never been given a ticket said that they would
park illegally to get to their final exam if the fine was $25. When the fine increased to
$150, the percentage dropped to approximately 30%. The difference between those who
have received a ticket and those who have not received a ticket was not statistically
significant. A Pearson Chi-Square value showed
X²(1) = 1.434; p > .05.
Results of Hypothesis 4 and 5
Hypothesis 4 and 5 were central in testing classical deterrence theory. Hypothesis
4 showed strong support for deterrence theory, specifically the effect of severity of
punishment. As the severity of punishment increased, the respondents’ perception of
their likelihood of offending decreased. Money (fines) seemed to have a real impact on
most students’ cost/benefit analysis.
The results from testing hypothesis 5 brought one of the main principles of
deterrence theory to light, certainty of punishment. Respondents were not as willing to
offend when the certainty of punishment was increased. A police officer’s mere presence
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has been used as a deterrent for many years. This finding shows some support for that
theory.
Conclusions and Implications
One goal of research is to contribute to the existing knowledge base. The instant
research focused on an integrated approach using two popular classical theories. Given
the findings, this research does help to fill the gap in the literature on criminological
theory. In particular, this research demonstrates the value of integrating theories.
Integrated approaches are becoming more common and this research is a prime
example of the benefits that come from researching with two theories rather than just one.
If this research had just been testing deterrence theory, the data would not have been able
to quantify respondents’ perceptions about their chances of getting a ticket. Also, if this
research had just been testing rational choice theory, then certainty and severity of
punishment would not have come into play. Obviously, to gain the level of
“explainability” that a researcher desires, it is important to employ as many theories and
variables as possible.
The revitalization of deterrence theory was highlighted throughout this research.
There is some research being done using classical criminology that is useful and it should
not be discarded as old notions. Just because something is old does not mean that it
cannot be applicable today. While rational choice theory needed no extra assistance in
contemporary popularity, this research examined a unique postulate of rational choice
theory, perceptions. While cost/benefit analysis is still the most common aspect of
rational choice theory researched, for a theory to grow, all of its postulates must be
researched and evaluated.
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One of the most interesting findings in this study was related to the questions
pertaining to a final exam. A large portion of this research has dealt with perception
being just as important as actuality. Students’ perceptions about their final exams were
quite influential in their decision making processes on the survey. Even when a police
officer was watching the respondent, the respondents reported that they were more likely
to offend (illegally park) if they had to get to their final exam.
Perceived certainty and severity of punishment seemed to affect individuals’
rational assumptions about their potential behavior. However, one interesting finding
from this study showed that perception and reality are different. Those who have actually
been punished before were not more inclined to conform (most of those who had received
an illegal parking ticket still continued to illegally park). However, when the questions
were posed about an individual’s perception about offending, most respondents showed
that they would be more likely to conform as their chances of getting a ticket increased
(police officer watching them illegally park). In addition, those who perceived their
chances of getting a ticket high were not less likely to offend than those who perceived
their chances low.
Consequently, future research should delve further into this finding. This finding
is exactly opposite of what rational choice theory dictates. Perhaps the fine should
fluctuate a little less between the survey questions. Maybe the jump between $25 and
$150 was so drastic that it altered the respondent’s decision making on the survey.
College students normally do not have a lot of money. Therefore, a questions pertaining
to a $150 fine may be absolutely out of the question.
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In the future, extra variables should be included as well. This researcher was
trying to keep the survey as short as possible to assist in keeping the response rate high.
However, in doing so, this study potentially missed out on a large sum of data that could
have contributed to the variance in responses. For example, one question asked
respondents about their employment status (part-time, full-time, or not working). Maybe
the survey should have included a question about the respondent’s income category (less
than $20,000, $20,000-$40,000, etc…). This addition to the survey alone would have
potentially explained the differences in responses between people who were poor, middle
class, and wealthy.
It should be noted that any attempt to duplicate this research should follow the
same theoretical framework used in this study. Deterrence theory is hard to measure.
The measurement of behavior that has the capability to actually be deterred is only
measuring an individuals’ perception of what he or she might do in a particular situation.
In addition, rational choice theory must be examined so that a true cost/benefit analysis
can be measured. This is the researcher’s explaining power potential. Perception versus
reality will always give different output statements. The key is to be consistent with what
you are measuring (internal validity). In this case, it is difficult to measure deterrence.
Therefore, rational choice theory has to be utilized in order to have a valid unit of
analysis to test the dependent variable.

56

References
Andenaes, J. (1975). “General Prevention Revisited: Research and Policy Implications.”
The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 66:338-365.
Beccaria, C. [1764] (1963). On Crimes and Punishments. Indianapolis, IN: BobbsMerrill.
Bentham, J. [1789] (1996). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.
Clarendon Press.
Blumstein, A., & Graddy, E. (1982). “Prevalence and Recidivism in Index Arrests: A
Feedback Model.” Law and Society Review, 16, 265-290.
Bollen, K. (1989). Structural equations with latent variables. New York, NY: Wiley.
Boudon, R. (1998). “Limitations of Rational Choice Theory.” The American Journal of
Sociology, 104 (3), 817-828.
Brown, S., Esbensen, F., and Geis, G. (2007). Criminology: Explaining Crime and Its
Context. Newark, NJ: Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
Cameron, M., & O’Conner, I. (2002). Juvenile Justice in Australia. In P. Grabosky, & A.
Graycar, (Eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Australian Criminology (pp. 211231). Australia: Brown Prior Anderson. Retrieved December 20, 2010, from
http://books.google.com/books
Chaiken, J., Lawless, M., & Stenenson, K. (1974). “The Impact of police Activity on
Subway Crime.” Urban Analysis, 3,173-205.
Chambliss, W. (1966). “The Deterrent Influence of Punishment.”Crime and Delinquency,
12, 70-75.

57

Clarke, R. (1980). “Situational’ Crime Prevention: Theory and Practice” The British
Journal of Criminology 20 (2): 136-147.
Clarke, R., & Cornish, D. (1985). “Modeling Offenders’ Decisions: A Framework for
Research and Policy.” Crime and Justice 6:147-185.
Cohen, L., & Felson, M. (1979). “Social Change and Crime Rates Trends: A Routine
Activity Approach.” American Sociological Review, 44, 588-608.
Common Data Set 2009-2010. (2009). Retrieved September 20, 2010, from
http://oir.memphis.edu/WebReports/CommonDataSets/CDS2009_2010.pdf
Cook, P. (1979). “A Unified Treatment of Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Rehabilitation:
A Simulation Study.” Durham, N.C.: Institute of Policy Sciences and Public
Affairs, Duke University.
Cook, P. (1980). “Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the
Second Decade.” Crime and Justice 2:211-268.
Cornish, D., & Clarke, R. (1987). “Understanding Crime Displacement: An Application
of rational Choice Theory.” Criminology, 25 (4), 933-948.
Demaris, A. (1995). “A Tutorial in Logistic Regression.” Journal of Marriage and the
Family, 57, 956-968.
Dugan, L., LaFree, G., & Piquero, A. (2005). “Testing a Rational Choice Model of
Airline Hijackings.” Criminology 43(4) 1031-1066.
Ferri, E. [1901] (1968). “Three Lectures Given at the University of Naples, Italy- April
22,23, and 24, 1901.” In S. Grupp, The Positive School of Criminology.
Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Gibbs, J. (1987). “State of Criminological Theory.” Criminology 25(4) 821-840.
58

Hechter, M. & Kanazawa, S. (1997). “Sociological Rational Choice Theory” Annual
Review of Sociology. 23:191-214.
Herrnstein, R. (1990). “Rational Choice Theory: Necessary but Not Sufficient.”
American Psychology, 45, 356-367.
Jacobs, B. (1996). “Crack Dealers and Restrictive Deterrence: Identifying NARCS.”
Criminology 34(3) 409-431.
Jaeger, C., Ortwin Renn, R., Eugene A., and Webler, T. (2001). Risk, Uncertainty, and
Rational Action. Earthscan.
Landes, W. (1978). “An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft Hijacking, 1961-1976.” The
Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 1-32.
Martinson, R., Lipton, D., and Wilks, J. (1975). Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment
– A Survey of Treatment Evaluation Studies. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
Matsueda, R., Kreager, D., Huizinga, D. (2006). “Deterring Delinquents: A Rational
Choice Model of Theft and Violence.” American Sociological Review, 71, 95122.
McCarthy, B, & Hagan, J. (2005). “Danger and the Decision to Offend.” Social Forces,
83, 1065-1096.
Miller, D., Rosenthal, A., Miller, D., and Ruzek, S. (1971). “Public Knowledge of
Criminal Penalties: A Research Report.” Theories of Punishment. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
Nagin, D. & Pogarsky, G. (2001). “Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal
Sanction Threats Into A Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence”
Criminology, 39 (4), 865-892.
59

Paternoster, R. (1987). “The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of
Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues.” Justice Quarterly, 4 (2), 173217.
Paternoster, R. (1989). “Decisions to Participate in and Desist from Four Types of
Common Delinquency: Deterrence and the Rational Choice Perspective.” Law
and Society Review 23:7-40.
Piliavin, I., Gartner, R., Thornton, C., & Matsueda, R. (1986). “Crime, Deterrence, and
Rational Choice.” American Sociological Review, 51, 101-119.
Rowe, A. and Tittle, C. (1974). “Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates – A Further Test of
the Deterrence Hypothesis.” Social Forces 52 (4), 455-462.
Taylor, I., Walton, P., and Young, J. (1973). The New Criminology. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul.
Timasheff, N. (1967). Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth. New York: Random
House, Inc.
Wilkins, L., & Chandler, A. (1965). “Confidence and Competence in Decision Making.”
British Journal of Criminology 5:22-35.
Willits, D. & Wadsworth, T. 2007-11-14 "Convenience Store Robberies and Rational
Choice Theory" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY, Atlanta Marriott Marquis, Atlanta, Georgia.
2010-10-24 from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p200991_index.html

60

Appendix A
Dear Student:
Date
I invite you to participate in a research project that will be conducted by graduate
student Brad Poole. The study is titled, “An Integrated Approach between Deterrence
and Rational Choice Theory.” The survey will take approximately 5 minutes or less to
complete. This research will serve as a component towards completion of my graduate
thesis.
Attached you will find the brief survey I am asking you to complete. Your
responses will remain completely anonymous. Please do not place your name or any
other information that could be used to identify you on this survey.
Your participation in this survey will result in no compensation nor have an effect
on your grade in this class. You may choose not to take this survey. Additionally, you
may choose to take the survey but not answer all the questions. There are no anticipated
physical, psychological, social, legal or other associated risks to stem from this survey.
I greatly appreciate your participation. If you have any questions or concerns,
please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,
Brad Poole
Graduate Student
Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice
The University of Memphis
brpoole@memphis.edu
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KB Turner, Ph.D.
Associate Professor and Graduate Coordinator
Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice
The University of Memphis
kbturner@memphis.edu

For answers to questions regarding the research subjects’ rights, the Chair of the
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects should be contacted at
678-2533.
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Appendix B
“An Integrated Approach between Deterrence and Rational Choice Theory”
1. Gender:

Male___

Female___

2. Age___
3. Race: Caucasian___ African American___ Latino___ Asian___ Native
American___ Other___
4. Classification: Freshman___ Sophomore___ Junior___ Senior___
Graduate/Law___
5. Major __________________________________________
6. Are you employed?
No___

Yes___
Full-time___

Part-time___

7. Do you live on campus?

Yes___

No___
8. Are you a student athlete?

Yes___

No___
If yes, what sport? _____________________
9. Have you ever parked illegally?

Yes___

No___
10. Have you ever parked illegally at the University of Memphis?

Yes___

No___
11. Have you ever been given a ticket for illegally parking?

Yes___

No___
12. After receiving a ticket, have you parked illegally again?

Yes___

No___
13. What do you perceive the chances are of you receiving a ticket for parking
illegally at the University of Memphis? ___%
14. Would you park illegally to get to class if the fine was $25?
No___
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Yes___

15. Would you park illegally to get to class if the fine was $150?

Yes___

No___
16. Would you park illegally to get to class if the fine was $25 and a police officer
was watching you?
Yes___

No___

17. Would you park illegally to get to class if the fine was $150 and a police officer
was watching you?
Yes___

No___

18. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam if the fine was $25?

Yes___

No___
19. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam if the fine was $150?

Yes___

No___
20. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam if the fine was $25 and a police
officer was watching you?
Yes___

No___

21. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam if the fine was $150 and a police
officer was watching you?
Yes___

No___
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Appendix C
Codebook
1.

Gender:

2.

Age:

3.

Race:

Male=1

Female=2

number in years
Caucasian=1

African American=2

Latino=3

Asian=4

Native American=5

Other=6
4.

Classification: Freshman=1 Sophomore=2 Junior=3 Senior=4 Graduate/law=5

5.

Major:

6.

Employed:

7.

Part or Full:

8.

Do you live on campus:

yes=1 no=2

9.

Student athlete:

yes=1 no=2

10. What sport:

degree student is seeking
yes=1 no=2
part=1 full=2

no answer=8

sport student plays

11. Have you ever parked illegally:

no answer=8

yes=1 no=2

12. Have you ever parked illegally at the U of M: yes=1 no=2
13. Have you ever been given a ticket for illegally parking: yes=1 no=2
14. Have you parked illegally again: yes=1 no=2
15. Chances of receiving a ticket:

no answer=8

percentage points %

no answered=8

16. Would you park illegally for $25: yes=1 no=2
17. Would you park illegally for $150:

yes=1

no=2

18. Would you park illegally for $25 if police were watching: yes=1 no=2
19. Would you park illegally for $150 if police were watching: yes=1 no=2
20. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam for $25: yes=1 no=2
21. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam for $150: yes=1 no=2
22. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam for $25 if police were watching:
yes=1 no=2
23. Would you park illegally to get to a final exam for $150 if police were watching:
yes=1 no=2
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Appendix D
Demographic Frequencies

Statistics
Gender
N

Valid
Missing

Age

Race

Classification

Major

Employed

505

505

505

505

505

505

330

0

0

0

0

0

0

175

Statistics
Doyouliveonca
mpus
N

Valid
Missing

StudentAthlete
505

505

0

0

Gender
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

male

210

41.6

41.6

41.6

female

295

58.4

58.4

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0

Age
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

PartorFull

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Traditional College Age

315

62.4

62.4

62.4

Non-traditional College Age

190

37.6

37.6

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0
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Race
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

caucasian

278

55.0

55.0

55.0

african american

195

38.6

38.6

93.7

latino

12

2.4

2.4

96.0

asian

4

.8

.8

96.8

native american

1

.2

.2

97.0

other

15

3.0

3.0

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0

Classification
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

freshman

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

95

18.8

18.8

18.8

sophomore

151

29.9

29.9

48.7

junior

102

20.2

20.2

68.9

senior

116

23.0

23.0

91.9

41

8.1

8.1

100.0

505

100.0

100.0

graduate/law
Total

Employed
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

328

65.0

65.0

65.0

no

176

34.9

34.9

99.8

3.00

1

.2

.2

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0
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Part or Full
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Missing

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

part

258

51.1

78.2

78.2

full

72

14.3

21.8

100.0

Total

330

65.3

100.0

8.00

175

34.7

505

100.0

Total

Do you live on campus
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

105

20.8

20.8

20.8

no

398

78.8

78.8

99.6

2

.4

.4

100.0

505

100.0

100.0

not answered
Total

Student Athlete
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

33

6.5

6.5

6.5

no

472

93.5

93.5

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0
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Frequencies of Theoretical Responses
Have you ever parked illegally
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

361

71.5

71.5

71.5

no

144

28.5

28.5

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0

Have you ever parked illegally at the u of m
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

288

57.0

57.0

57.0

no

217

43.0

43.0

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0

Have you ever been given a ticket for illegally parking
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

267

52.9

52.9

52.9

no

238

47.1

47.1

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0

Have you parked illegally again
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Missing
Total

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

178

35.2

37.9

37.9

no

292

57.8

62.1

100.0

Total

470

93.1

100.0

8.00

35

6.9

505

100.0
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Chances of getting a ticket
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Missing

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

low

200

39.6

41.0

41.0

moderate

140

27.7

28.7

69.7

high

148

29.3

30.3

100.0

Total

488

96.6

100.0

17

3.4

505

100.0

no answer

Total

Would you park illegally for 25 dollars
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

215

42.6

42.6

42.6

no

290

57.4

57.4

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0

One hundred fifty dollars
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

11

2.2

2.2

2.2

no

494

97.8

97.8

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0

Twenty five dollars and police
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

64

12.7

12.7

12.7

no

441

87.3

87.3

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0

70

One fifty and police
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

yes

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

8

1.6

1.6

1.6

no

497

98.4

98.4

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0

Final exam 25
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

405

80.2

80.2

80.2

no

100

19.8

19.8

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0

Final exam 150
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

164

32.5

32.5

32.5

no

341

67.5

67.5

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0

Final exam 25 and police
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

283

56.0

56.0

56.0

no

222

44.0

44.0

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0
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Final exam 150 and police
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

yes

130

25.7

25.7

25.7

no

375

74.3

74.3

100.0

Total

505

100.0

100.0
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Appendix E

Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforillegallyparking * Haveyouparkedillegallyagain Crosstabulation
Haveyouparkedillegallya
gain
yes
Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforillegally

ye Count

parking

s

no
173

% within

97.2%

Total
94

267

32.2% 56.8%

Haveyouparkedillegallya
gain
no Count

5

% within

2.8%

198

203

67.8% 43.2%

Haveyouparkedillegallya
gain
Total

Count
% within

178

292

470

100.0%

100.0%

100.0

Haveyouparkedillegallya

%

gain

Chi-Square Tests

Value

df

Asymp. Sig. (2-

Exact Sig. (2-

Exact Sig. (1-

sided)

sided)

sided)

190.419a

1

.000

Continuity Correction

187.779

1

.000

Likelihood Ratio

230.304

1

.000

Pearson Chi-Square
b

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear

.000
190.014

1

.000

Association
N of Valid Cases

470

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 76.88.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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.000

Haveyoueverparkedillegallyattheuofm * Chancesofgettingaticket Crosstabulation
Chancesofgettingaticket
moderat
low
Haveyoueverparkedillegallyattheuof

ye

Count

m

s

% within

e

high

Total

92

92

97

281

46.0%

65.7%

65.5%

57.6%

108

48

51

207

54.0%

34.3%

34.5%

42.4%

200

140

148

488

100.0

100.0%

100.0

100.0

%

%

Chancesofgettingaticke
t
no

Count
% within
Chancesofgettingaticke
t

Total

Count
% within
Chancesofgettingaticke

%

t

Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig. (2Value

df

sided)

18.613a

2

.000

Likelihood Ratio

18.619

2

.000

Linear-by-Linear Association

14.567

1

.000

Pearson Chi-Square

N of Valid Cases

488

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected
count is 59.39.
Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforillegallyparking * finalexam25 Crosstabulation
finalexam25
yes
Haveyoueverbeengivenatick yes

Count

etforillegallyparking

% within finalexam25
no

Count
% within finalexam25

Total

Count
% within finalexam25
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no

Total

220

47

267

54.3%

47.0%

52.9%

185

53

238

45.7%

53.0%

47.1%

405

100

505

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

Value

df

Asymp. Sig. (2-

Exact Sig. (2-

Exact Sig. (1-

sided)

sided)

sided)

a

1

.189

Continuity Correction

1.444

1

.230

Likelihood Ratio

1.722

1

.189

Pearson Chi-Square

1.725
b

Fisher's Exact Test

.219

Linear-by-Linear

1.722

1

.115

.189

Association
N of Valid Cases

505

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 47.13.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

wouldyouparkillegallyfor25dollars * twentyfivedollarsandpolice Crosstabulation
twentyfivedollarsandpolic
e
yes
wouldyouparkillegallyfor25dolla ye

Count

rs

% within

s

no

Total

63

152

215

29.3%

70.7%

100.0

wouldyouparkillegallyfor25dolla

%

rs
% within

98.4%

34.5%

42.6%

1

289

290

.3%

99.7%

100.0

twentyfivedollarsandpolice
no

Count
% within
wouldyouparkillegallyfor25dolla

%

rs
% within

1.6%

65.5%

57.4%

64

441

505

12.7%

87.3%

100.0

twentyfivedollarsandpolice
Total

Count
% within
wouldyouparkillegallyfor25dolla
rs

75

%

wouldyouparkillegallyfor25dollars * twentyfivedollarsandpolice Crosstabulation
twentyfivedollarsandpolic
e
yes
wouldyouparkillegallyfor25dolla ye

Count

rs

% within

s

no

Total

63

152

215

29.3%

70.7%

100.0

wouldyouparkillegallyfor25dolla

%

rs
% within

98.4%

34.5%

42.6%

1

289

290

.3%

99.7%

100.0

twentyfivedollarsandpolice
no

Count
% within
wouldyouparkillegallyfor25dolla

%

rs
% within

1.6%

65.5%

57.4%

64

441

505

12.7%

87.3%

100.0

twentyfivedollarsandpolice
Total

Count
% within
wouldyouparkillegallyfor25dolla

%

rs
% within

100.0%

100.0%

100.0

twentyfivedollarsandpolice

%

Chi-Square Tests

Value

Exact Sig. (2-

Exact Sig. (1-

sided)

sided)

sided)

93.547a

1

.000

90.949

1

.000

110.513

1

.000

Pearson Chi-Square
b

Continuity Correction
Likelihood Ratio

df

Asymp. Sig. (2-

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear

.000
93.362

1

.000

Association
N of Valid Cases

505

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 27.25.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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.000

Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforillegallyparking * onehundredfiftydollars Crosstabulation
onehundredfiftyd
ollars
yes
Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforilleg ye Count
allyparking

s

no
9

% within

3.4%

Total

258

267

96.6% 100.0

Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforilleg

%

allyparking
% within onehundredfiftydollars

81.8%

52.2%

52.9
%

n

Count

o

% within

2
.8%

236

238

99.2% 100.0

Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforilleg

%

allyparking
% within onehundredfiftydollars

18.2%

47.8%

47.1
%

Total

Count

11

% within

2.2%

494

505

97.8% 100.0

Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforilleg

%

allyparking
% within onehundredfiftydollars

100.0% 100.0% 100.0
%

Chi-Square Tests

Value

df

Exact

Exact

Asymp. Sig. (2-

Sig. (2-

Sig. (1-

sided)

sided)

sided)

3.781a

1

.052

Continuity Correction

2.687

1

.101

Likelihood Ratio

4.132

1

.042

Pearson Chi-Square
b

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association
N of Valid Cases

.067
3.774

1

.052

505

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.18.
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.047

Chi-Square Tests

Value

df

Exact

Exact

Asymp. Sig. (2-

Sig. (2-

Sig. (1-

sided)

sided)

sided)

a

1

.052

Continuity Correction

2.687

1

.101

Likelihood Ratio

4.132

1

.042

Pearson Chi-Square

3.781
b

Fisher's Exact Test

.067

Linear-by-Linear Association

3.774

N of Valid Cases

1

.047

.052

505

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.18.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforillegallyparking * finalexam150 Crosstabulation
finalexam150
yes
Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforillega ye

Count

llyparking

% within

s

93

Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforillega

34.8

no
174

Total
267

65.2 100.0

%

%

%

56.7

51.0

52.9

%

%

%

71

167

238

llyparking
% within finalexam150

no

Count
% within
Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforillega

29.8

70.2 100.0

%

%

%

43.3

49.0

47.1

%

%

%

Count

164

341

505

% within

32.5

67.5 100.0

llyparking
% within finalexam150

Total

Haveyoueverbeengivenaticketforillega

%

%

%

llyparking
% within finalexam150

100.0 100.0 100.0
%
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%

%

Chi-Square Tests

Value

df

Asymp. Sig. (2-

Exact Sig. (2-

Exact Sig. (1-

sided)

sided)

sided)

a

1

.231

Continuity Correction

1.215

1

.270

Likelihood Ratio

1.438

1

.231

Pearson Chi-Square

1.434
b

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear

.254
1.431

1

.232

Association
N of Valid Cases

505

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 77.29.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
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.135

